Using AI approaches to automatically design mechanisms has been a central research mission at the interface of AI and economics [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002] . Previous approaches that a empt to design revenue optimal auctions for the multi-dimensional se ings fall short in at least one of the three aspects: 1) representation -search in a space that probably does not even contain the optimal mechanism; 2) exactness -nding a mechanism that is either not truthful or far from optimal; 3) domain dependence -need a di erent design for di erent environment se ings.
Introduction
Designing revenue optimal mechanisms in various se ings has been a central research agenda in economics, ever since the seminal works of Vickrey [26] and Myerson [17] in single item auctions. Lately, designing optimal mechanisms for selling multiple items has also been established as an important research agenda at the interface of economics and computer sciences [6, 14, 13, 3, 4, 15, 28, 21, 29, 22, 23] Due to diversity in the researchers' backgrounds, there are a number of quite di erent angles to study this problem. e standard economics theme aims to understand the exact optimal mechanisms in various se ings. To name a few, Armstrong [2] obtains the revenue optimal mechanisms of selling two items to one buyer, whose valuations of the two items are perfect positively correlated (a ray through the origin). Manelli and Vincent [16] obtains partial characterization of optimal mechanisms, in the form of extremely points in the mechanism spaces. Pavlov [19] derives optimal mechanisms for two items when the buyer has symmetric uniform distributions. Daskalakis et al. [8] characterizes su cient and necessary conditions for a mechanism to optimal and derive optimal mechanisms for two items for several valuation distributions. Tang and Wang [23] obtain the revenue optimal mechanisms of selling two items, of which the valuations are perfect negatively correlated. Yao [29] obtains the revenue optimal mechanisms of selling two additive items to multiple buyers, whose valuation towards the items are binary and independent.
Another category of research rooted in the AGT community aims to resolve the di culties of characterizing optimal mechanisms via the lens of algorithm design. Cai et al. [3] and Alaei et al. [1] gives algorithmic characterizations of the optimal BIC mechanisms on discrete distributions using linear programs. Hartline and Roughgarden [14] , Yao [28] , Hart and Nisan [13] nd approximately optimal mechanisms in various se ings. Carroll [5] shows that for a certain multi-dimensional screening problem, the worst-case optimal mechanism is simply to sell each item separately. e third category, at the interface of AI and economics, aims to search for the optimal mechanisms via various AI approaches. Conitzer and Sandholm [6] model the problem of revenue and welfare maximization as an instance of constraints satisfaction problem (CSP) through which the optimal mechanism may be found using various search techniques, despite its general computation complexity. Sandholm and Likhodedov [21] model a restricted revenue maximization problem (within a ne maximizing auctions) as a parameter search problem in a multi-dimensional parameter space, they nd several sets of parameters that yields good empirical revenue. Dü ing et al. [9] aims to learn optimal mechanisms by repeatedly sampling from the distribution. ey obtain mechanisms that are approximately optimal and approximately incentive compatible.
One advantage of these computational approaches is that most of them are constructive so that one can systematically and computationally generate optimal mechanisms. However, a di culty for most existing works in computer science (the second and third categories) is that mechanisms obtained this way are either not optimal in the exact sense, or not truthful in the exact sense. As a result, a typical economist may have a hard time to appreciate this type of results. A more desirable approach would be constructive on one hand and be able return exact incentive compatible and (hopefully) exact optimal mechanisms on the other hand.
Our methodology
In this paper, motivated by the above observation, we aim to put forward a computational approach that can design or assist one to design exact IC and optimal mechanisms. Similar to the approach introduced by Dü ing et al. [9] , we train a neural network that represents the optimal mechanism using the valuation distributions. Unlike their approach, however, we introduce another neural network that represents buyer's behavior. In particular, this network takes a mechanism as input, and output an action. Our network structure resembles that of the generative adversarial nets (GAN) [10] but is essentially di erent because we do not need to train the buyer's network. is independent buyer network allows us to easily model the exact IC constraints (which has been a major di culty in previous works) in our network and any behavior model of this form. In contrast, Dü ing et al. [9] rst propose to hardwire the IC constraints into the mechanism network (which requires a lot of domain knowledge and the structure of the networks has to be domain speci c), as a result their approach can only reproduce mechanisms in the domains where the form of the optimal mechanism is known. To circumvent this di culty, they further propose to add IC as a so constraint so that the training objective is to minimize a linear combination of revenue loss and the degree of IC violations. However, this would produce mechanisms that are not IC.
Another innovation of our approach is that we represent a mechanism as a menu (a list of (valuation, outcome) tuples) in the single buyer case. According to the taxation principle [27] , by simply le ing the buyer do the selection, we get an IC mechanism. An additional merit of using a menu to represent a mechanism is that it enables explicit restrictions of the menu size of the mechanism, which measures the degree of complexity of a mechanism [12] .
Our results
We then apply our learning-aided mechanism design framework to the domain where a seller sells two items to one buyer. In particular, we investigate the following problems.
• What is the revenue optimal mechanisms when the menu size is restricted to a constant? To the best of our knowledge, the optimal mechanism of this kind remains unknown for our se ing.
• What is optimal mechanism for the case where the valuation domain is a triangle? e previously studied cases on this domain all focuses on rectangle shaped valuation domain (expect for Haghpanah and Hartline [11] ).
• What is the revenue optimal deterministic mechanism?
• What is the revenue optimal mechanism when the buyer has combinatorial value?
Some of the experimental results we obtained is shown in Table 1 with comparison to the exact optimal mechanisms (some of them are previously known results, while the others are our new ndings).
Inspired by these empirical ndings, using the techniques by Daskalakis et al. [8] and Pavlov [20] , we then prove the exact optimal mechanisms for the rst two problems. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst time to nd the exact optimal mechanisms in these domains, so they are of independent interests to the economics society as well. eorem (Restricted Menu Size). e optimal mechanism for an additive buyer, v ∼ U[0, 1] 2 , with menu size no more than 3 is to either sell the rst item at price 2/3 or sell the bundle of two items at price 5/6, yielding revenue 59/108.
Distributions
In particular, the optimal mechanism must be asymmetric even if the distribution is symmetric! eorem (Uniform Distribution on a Triangle). e optimal mechanism for an additive buyer with value uniformly 
Preliminaries
In this paper, we consider the automated mechanism design problem for the single-buyer multi-dimensional se ing. In this section, we introduce the basic notions for optimal multidimensional mechanism design problem. Environment e seller has m heterogeneous items for sale, and the buyer has di erent private values for receiving di erent bundles of the items. An allocation of the items is speci ed by a vector x ∈ X ⊆ [0, 1] m , where x i is the probability of allocating the i-th item to the buyer. An allocation x is called a deterministic allocation, if x ∈ {0, 1} m ; otherwise a randomized allocation or a lo ery allocation.
A possible outcome of the mechanism consists of a valid allocation vector x ∈ X and a monetary transfer amount p ∈ R + , called payment, from the buyer to the seller.
With the standard quasi-linear utility assumption, the valuation function v : X → R + describes the private preference of the buyer, i.e., an outcome x, p is (weakly) preferred than another outcome x , p , if and only if:
In other words, the outcome with the highest utility is most preferred by the buyer. Mechanism A naïve mechanism (without applying the revelation principle) is de ned by a set of actions and a mapping from the set of actions to the set of outcomes. Note that according to the taxation principle [27] , simply le ing the buyer do the selection, we get an incentive compatible mechanism. Formally, De nition 2.1 (Naïve Mechanism). A naïve mechanism consists of an action set A and an associated mapping from any action to a possible outcome, i.e., x, p : A → X × R + .
In particular, there exists a special action ⊥ meaning "exiting the mechanism" such that
In such a naïve mechanism, a strategy of the buyer is then a mapping from the set of private valuation functions to the action set, i.e., s : V → A. Furthermore, if the buyer is rational, then her strategy must maximize her utility:
e corresponding outcomes of the actions are also known as menu items. roughout this paper, we use [x, p] to denote a speci c menu item, e.g., the zero menu item [0, 0] = [(0, . . . , 0), 0] is the corresponding menu item of the exiting action ⊥. Note that the naïve mechanism with the menu presentation is a very general model of the mechanism design problem. In particular, even when the buyer is not fully rational, as long as a buyer behavior is available, the mechanism designer is still able to design the menus to maximize his objective assuming that the buyer responses according to the given behavior model. e robustness of naïve mechanisms is indeed critical to the exibility and generality of our methodology. Direct Mechanism With the above de nition of naïve mechanisms, it is hard to characterize all the mechanisms with certain properties, because the design of the action set, at rst glance, could be arbitrary. One critical step in the mechanism design theory is to applying the celebrating revelation principle [18, p.224 ] to restrict the set of naïve mechanisms to a considerably smaller set of mechanisms -the direct mechanisms. In a direct mechanism, the action set is restricted to be identical to the set of valuation functions and the identity mapping also is required to be an optimal strategy for any rational buyer. Formally, De nition 2.2 (Direct Mechanism). A direct mechanism xes the action set A = V and remains to specify the mapping from V to the set of possible outcomes.
In addition, the identity mapping must be a utility-maximizing strategy for any rational buyer, which can be equivalently stated as the following incentive compatible (IC) and individually rational (IR) constraints:
In fact, the constraints (IC) and (IR) are deduced from the constraints (R ) and (E ). e Designer's Goal e goal of the mechanism designer is to maximize the expectation of his objective r : X×R + → R, where the expectation is taken over his prior knowledge about the buyer's private valuation function, i.e., v ∼ F .
We emphasize that our methodology is not restricted to any speci c objective. However, in this paper, we would focus on the se ing with the seller's revenue as the objective:
Because revenue-optimal mechanism design in multi-dimensional environment is a both challenging and widely studied problem. Hence applying our method in such a se ing allows us to verify that (i) whether it can nd the optimal or nearly optimal solution, and (ii) whether it can provide a simpler approach to a hard problem.
Assumptions In most sections of this paper, we will make to the following two assumptions (Assumption 2.3 and Assumption 2.4). As we just stated, we would rst verify that our method can be used to recover the optimal solutions to some known problems and li le exact optimal solution is actually discovered without these two assumptions. Assumption 2.3 (Additive Valuation Functions). e buyer's valuation function v is additive, i.e., v can be decomposed as follows:
where
With the additive valuation assumption, we refer each v i as the value of the i-th item. Moreover, we can make the following independent value assumption in addition. Assumption 2.4 (Independent Values). e prior distribution F is independent in each dimension and can be decomposed as
In the meanwhile, to show that our method is not limited to these assumptions, in Section 5, we show how it can be applied to se ings without these assumptions. In particular, with the help of the characterization results by Daskalakis et al. [8] , we are able to verify the optimality of the solution to an instance with correlated value distribution (while still with additive valuation functions).
Problem Analysis
Although the revelation principle is widely adopted by the theoretical analysis of mechanism design problems to e ciently restrict the design spaces, we decided not to follow this approach when applying neural networks to solve such problems.
e main di culty of directly following the traditional revelation principle based approach is two-fold:
• It is unclear that what network structure can directly encode the incentive compatible (IC) and individually rational (IR) constraints;
• Some of the characterization results for additive valuation se ing 2 can be cast to certain network structures, but such structures are restricted (to additive valuation assumption) and heavily rely on the domain knowledge of the speci c mechanism design problem.
In fact, the above di culties also limit the generality of the methods built on these elegant but speci c characterizations. For example, there might be some fundamental challenges while generalizing such approaches to the se ings where the buyer is risk-averse (risk-seeking) or has partial (or bounded) rationality, etc. Furthermore, in many real applications, the buyer behavior models may come from real data instead of pure theoretical assumptions.
To circumvent these di culties and ensure the highest extendability, in this paper, we build up our method from the most basic naïve mechanisms -simply let the buyer choose her favorite option -which is even more close to the rst principles of how people make decisions. Interestingly, via this approach, our method will automatically produce an exactly incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst neural network based approach that outputs an both exactly incentive compatible and exactly individually rational mechanism under multi-dimensional se ings.
Revisiting the Naïve Mechanism
We then brie y explain show how the naïve mechanism helps us to formulate a neural network based approach for mechanism design.
Intuitively, the naïve mechanism in our context simply provides the buyer various menu items, i.e., allocations associated with di erent prices, and lets her choose the most prefered one. In this case, once a buyer utility function is speci ed (either by assumption or learnt from data), the choice of the buyer is simply an argmax of the utility function. As long as the utility function could be encoded via neural network, which is a mild assumption, the buyer's behavior model can encoded as a neural network with an additional argmax layer. 3 High-level sketch of the network structure For now, we can think the encoded mechanism as a black-box that outputs a set of allocation-payment pairs (see Figure 1 (a)). ese pairs then are feeded into many "buyer networks", each with di erent private valuation functions (hence di erent choices). Finally, the "buyer networks" output their choices and the choices are used to evaluate the expected objective of the mechanism designer, where the choices are weighted according to the probabilities of the corresponding private valuation functions and the training loss is simply the negative of the expected objective.
One key advantage of formulating the network as a naïve mechanism rather than a direct mechanism is that no additional constraints (such as IC and IR) are required for the former. In fact, the di culty of optimizing the direct mechanism network (see Figure 1(b) ) is that the violations of IC or IC constraints are not directly re ected in the designer's objective. Hence the standard optimization methods for neural networks do not directly apply. In contrast, in the naïve mechanism network, the e ect of any mechanism outcome mutations on the buyer preferences is re ected in the designer's objective via the "buyer networks". Such properties facilitate the optimization in standard training methods of neural networks.
Network Structure
Our network structure contains two networks: the mechanism network and the buyer network. Since the networks represent a naïve mechanism, the output of the mechanism network is a set of choices along with di erent prices (or menu items) and the buyer network takes the set of menu items as input and outputs its choice. e overall network structure is shown in Figure 2 .
Mechanism Network
In most applications, a neural network usually takes a possible input x and then outputs a possible output y. However, our mechanism network is di erent from most neural networks in the sense that its output is a set of menu items, which already represents the entire mechanism. erefore, our mechanism network does not actually need to take an input to give an output.
However, in order to t in with most neural network frameworks, we use a one dimensional constant 1 as the input of our mechanism network. e output of the network consists of two parts. e rst part is an allocation matrix X of m rows and k columns, where m is the number of items and k is the number of menu items. Each column of the allocation matrix contains the allocation of all m item. e second part is a payment vector p of length k, representing k di erent prices for the k menu items. e last column of the allocation matrix and the last element of the payment vector is always set to be 0. is encodes the "exit" choice of the buyer and ensures that the buyer can always choose this menu item to guarantee individual rationality.
e structure of the mechanism network is simple enough. e constant input 1 goes through a 1 fully connected layer to form each row X i (except the last column, which is always 0) of the allocation matrix. We choose the sigmoid function as the activation function since the allocation of each item is always inside the interval [0, 1]. e payment vector is even simpler. Each element p i of the payment vector is formed by multiplying the input constant by a scalar parameter. erefore, the training of our network is very fast, since the network structure is very simple.
Buyer Network
e buyer network is a function that maps a mechanism to the buyer's strategy s(v) (a distribution over all possible menu items) for each value pro le v = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v m ), where each v i is the value of ge ing the i-th item. e output of the mechanism network (the allocation matrix X and the payment vector p) is taken as the input of the buyer network. To de ne the output of the buyer network, suppose that each v i is bounded and 0 ≤ v i ≤v i . We discretize the interval [0,v i ] to d i discrete values. Let V i be the set of possible discrete values of v i and de ne
e output of the buyer network is a m + 1 dimensional tensor, with the rst m dimension corresponding the buyer's m dimensional value, and the last dimension representing the probability of choosing each menu item. erefore, the i-th (i ≤ m) dimension of the tensor has length d i and the last dimension has length k.
Although here we use the same notation as in Assumption 2.3, this notation does not lose generality since we do not make any assumption about the buyer's valuation of obtaining multiple items or only a fraction of an item. It is also worth mentioning that the buyer's utility function is not necessary to build the buyer network, since the network only outputs buyer's strategy, which may not even be consistent with any utility function. In other cases, the buyer network can be constructed according to his utility function, or other networks trained from interaction data. e buyer network can be any type of network that has the same format of input and output as described above. When we do not know the buyer's exact utility function but have plenty of interaction data (e.g., the sponsored search se ing), we can train the buyer network with the the interaction data.
When the buyer's utility function is known, we can manually design the buyer network structure so that the network outputs the buyer's strategy more accurately. For example, when Assumption 2.3 and Assumption 2.4 holds, we know that the buyer always choose the menu item that maximizes his additive valuation with probability 1. We can construct m tensors V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V m , with size
In V i , an element's value is only determined by its i-th dimensional index in the tensor, and it equals the j-th discretized value of the interval [0,v i ], if its i-th dimensional index is j. Recall that the i-th row of the allocation matrix X i represents di erent allocations of the i-th item in di erent menu items. We then multiply the i-th tensor with the X i to get an m + 1 dimensional tensor X i with size
We also construct a payment tensor P with size
where an element equals to the p i if its index for the last dimension is j.
Finally, we compute the utility tensor U by
And then apply the so max function to the last dimension of the utility tensor U to produce the output S , which is an aggregation of s(v), ∀v ∈ V. One can easily verify that for each value pro le, the menu with the largest utility has the highest probability of being chosen. Of course, we also multiply the utility tensor by a large constant to make the probability of the best menu item close enough to 1.
Loss Function
e loss function can be any function speci ed according the mechanism designer's objective. However, in this paper, we mainly focus on how to optimize the revenue of the mechanism and set the loss function to be the negative revenue. Recall that the output of the buyer network is the buyer's strategy s(v) for each value pro le v. en the loss function of the networks is
where Pr [v] is the probability that v appears, which can be easily computed from the joint value distribution F . Note that in the above loss function, we do not make any assumption about the probability distribution Pr[v]. Our networks are able to handle any joint distribution, including correlated ones.
Experiments and Analysis
In this section, we rst list some results of our neural networks in Section 5.1. Inspired by these results, we are able to nd the closed-form optimal mechanisms in some cases. We list theoretical analysis and proofs in Section 5.2.
Experiment results

Uniform
e optimal mechanism for this se ing is already known [24] . We draw both the optimal mechanism and our experiments results together in Figure 3 . e color blocks represents the mechanism given by our network, where each color corresponds to a di erent menu item. e dashed line represents the optimal mechanism (they are NOT drawn according to the color blocks). e two mechanisms are almost identical except for the slight di erence in Figure 3 (c).
Correlated Distribution: Uniform Triangle
Suppose that the buyer's value v = (v 1 , v 2 ) is uniformly distributed among the triangle described by Figure 4 show the mechanisms given by our network. Note that in our framework, the joint value distribution is only used to compute the objective function. So our framework can handle arbitrary value distributions.
In fact, guided by these experiment results, we are able to nd the closed-form optimal mechanism for this kind of value distributions. In particular, there are two possible cases for this problem. When c is large, the optimal e proof is deferred to Section 5.2.
Restricted Menu Size
e output of our mechanism network is a set of menus. us we can control the menu size by directly se ing the output size of the network.
Restricting the menu size results in simpler mechanisms. It is known that the optimal menu for some distributions contains in nitely many items [8] . Such results directly motivates the study of simple mechanisms, since they are easier to implement and optimize in practice.
We consider the case where the buyer's value is uniformly distributed in the unit square [0, 1] 2 . It is known that the optimal mechanism contains 4 menu items. When the menu can only contain at most 2 items, the optimal mechanism is to trivially set a posted price for the bundle. e experiment results are shown in Figure 5. ] Surprisingly, when the menu can have at most 3 items, our network gives an asymmetric menu, despite that the value distribution is symmetric. In fact, we can also nd the optimal menu with at most 3 items analytically. Our analysis shows that the optimal menu is indeed asymmetric. e intuition is that, if we add a symmetry constraint to the solution, then the optimal menu degenerates to a 2-item one. We provide the theoretical result here, but defer the proof to Section 5.2. eorem 5.2. e optimal at-most-three-menu mechanism for two additive items with v ∼ U[0, 1] 2 is to sell the rst item at price 2/3 or the bundle of two items at price 5/6, yielding revenue 59/108 ≈ 0.546296.
By symmetry, the mechanism could also be selling the second item at price 2/3 or the bundle of two items at price 5/6. In particular, these is no other at-most-three-menu mechanisms could generate as much revenue as they do.
Unit-Demand Buyer
e unit-demand se ing is also intensively studied in the literature. In this se ing, the allocation must satisfy x 1 + x 2 ≤ 1. [25] provides detailed analysis and closed-form solutions on the unit-demand se ing. With slight modi cations, our mechanism network can also produce feasible allocations in this se ing. Instead of applying the sigmoid function to each element of the allocation matrix, we apply a so max function to each column (representing each menu item) of the allocation matrix. However, with such a modi cation, the allocation satis es x 1 + x 2 = 1 rather than x 1 + x 2 ≤ 1. e solution is to add an extra dummy element to each column before applying the so max function.
e experiment results are shown in Figure 6 (a). 
Combinatorial Value
Our framework structure can also handle the case where the buyer has combinatorial values. e following Figure  6 (b) shows mechanism given by our network for a buyer with u(
In this case, we need to slightly modify the buyer network by adding the extra v 1 v 2 term, which can be easily implemented.
Deterministic Mechanisms
We can use our networks to nd the optimal deterministic mechanisms for any joint value distributions. Similar to the restricted menu size case, deterministic mechanisms are also important in practice, since they are easy to understand and implement. In this case, the mechanism network can be further simpli ed, since for selling 2 items, there can only be 4 possible deterministic menu items, with allocations (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) . erefore, the only parameters in the mechanism network are the corresponding prices. Figure 6 (c) shows our experiment results on uniform distributions among the triangle described in subsubsection 5.1.2. According to eorem 5.1, the optimal mechanism is not deterministic when c = 2, Our experiments show that such a constraint decreases the revenue by 0.14%.
eoretically Provable Optimal Mechanisms
In this section, we provide theoretical proofs for some of the ndings via our neural network. To the best of our knowledge, these results are previously unknown.
Optimal mechanisms for selling two items with correlated distributions
As described in Section 5.1.2, there are two possible cases for the optimal mechanism when the buyer's value is uniformly distributed among the triangle. e solutions are shown in Figure 7 . We solve the problem case by case. To prove eorem 5.3, we apply the duality theory in [8, 7] to our se ing. We provide a brief description here and refer readers to [8] and [7] for details.
Let f (v) be the joint value distribution of v = (v 1 , v 2 ), and V be the support of f (v). De ne measures µ 0 , µ ∂ , µ s as follows:
• µ 0 has a single point mass at v = 0, i.e., µ 0 (V) = I(v ∈ A), where I(·) is the indicator function, and v ∈ A is the smallest type in V.
• µ ∂ is only distributed along the boundary of V, with a density f (v)(v ·η(v)), where η(v) is the outer unit normal vector at v.
• µ s is distributed in V with a density ∇ f (v) · v + (n + 1) f (v), where n is the number of items.
Let µ = µ 0 + µ ∂ − µ s . De ne µ + and µ − to be two non-negative measures such that µ = µ + − µ − . Let V + and V − be the support sets of µ + and µ − . [8, 7] shows that designing an optimal mechanism for selling n items to 1 buyer is equivalent to solving the following program:
where u(v) is the utility of the buyer when his value is v, and
Relax the above program by removing the convexity constraint and write the dual program of the relaxed program:
where Γ(µ + , µ − ) is the set of non-negative measures γ de ned over V × V such that, for any V ⊆ V, the following equations hold:
Lemma 5.5 ([8]). (D) is a weak dual of (P).
We omit the proof here but refer readers to [8] and [7] for details. e dual program (D) has an optimal transport interpretation. We "move" the mass from µ + to other points to form µ − and the measure γ corresponds to the amount of mass that goes from each point to another in V.
Although (D) is only a weak dual of (P), we can still use it to certify the optimality of a solution. We already give a menu in eorem 5.3. erefore, the relaxed convexity constraint is automatically satis ed if the buyer always choose the best menu item.
In our se ing, f (v) = Let R i be the region of T such that for any v ∈ R i , choosing menu item i maximizes the buyer's utility. It is straightforward to verify that the measures µ + and µ − are balanced inside each region, i.e., µ + (R i ) = µ − (R i ), ∀i. erefore, the transport of mass only happens inside each region.
We construct the transport in R 1 and R 2 as follows:
• R 1 : µ + is concentrated on a single point 0. We move the mass at 0 uniformly to all points in R 1 ;
• R 2 : µ + is only distributed along the upper boundary of R 2 . For each point v at the upper boundary, we draw a vertical line l through it, and move the mass at v uniformly to the points in L ∩ R 2 .
However, for R 3 , µ + is also only distributed along the upper boundary, but there is no easy transport as for R 1 and R 2 . We provide the following Lemma 5.6. Lemma 5.6. For R 3 , there exists a transport of mass, such that for any two points v, v , if there is non-negative transport
e proof of Lemma 5.6 is deferred to Appendix A.1. With this lemma, we can simplify our proof of eorem 5.3, and do not need to construct the measure γ explicitly. New we compute the objective of the dual program (D). And to prove the optimality of the menu, it su ces to show that the objective of (D) is equal to R .
Note that in our construction of the transport in R 1 and R 2 , we only allow transport inside each region. In R 1 , we transport mass from point 0 to other points. So it does not contribute to the objective of (D), and we can just ignore R 1 . In R 2 , the mass is always moved vertically down. erefore, for any v, v , such that there is positive mass transport from v to v , we have
For the rst term, we have:
where the rst equation is due to the fact that our transport is inside each region, and {σ j } is a partition of the region R 2 . When the maximum area of σ j approaches 0, we get:
Similarly, the second term of Equation (4) is:
For R 3 , according to Lemma 5.6, it is also true that when there is positive mass transport from v to v , we always
For the rst term,
Similarly, for the second term,
erefore, the objective of the dual program (D) is:
e above equation shows that the dual objective is equal to the actual revenue, which certi es that the menu is optimal.
When c ≤ 4 3 , the optimal mechanism only has two menu items. eorem 5.7. For any 1 ≤ c ≤ 4 3 , suppose that the buyer's type is uniformly distributed among the set
. en the optimal menu contains the following two items: (0, 0), 0 and (1, 1) ,
One can prove eorem 5.7 with the same trick in Lemma 5.6. We omit the proof of this theorem since it is easier compared to the other case described in eorem 5.3.
Optimal mechanisms under limited menu size constraints
In this section, we consider the optimal 3-Menu Mechanisms for value distribution U[0, 1] 2 . eorem 5.8.
e optimal symmetric at-most-three-menu mechanism for two additive items with v ∼ U[0, 1] 2 is to sell the bundle of two items at price √ 6/3, yielding revenue 2 √ 6/9 ≈ 0.54433.
We defer the proof to Appendix A.
eorem 5.9. e optimal at-most-three-menu mechanism for two additive items with v ∼ U[0, 1] 2 is to sell the rst item at price 2/3 or the bundle of two items at price 5/6, yielding revenue 59/108 ≈ 0.546296.
By symmetry, the mechanism could also be selling the second item at price 2/3 or the bundle of two items at price 5/6. In particular, these is no other at-most-three-menu mechanisms could generate as much revenue as they do. To establish the connection between the menus and the revenue, let S A be the set of values that menu A is the most preferred:
Similarly, we de ne S B and S Z be the set of values where menu B and menu Z are the most preferred, respectively: • Even within each speci c case, the revenue R is still a high-order function with 6 variables. In general, there is no guarantee for closed-form solutions.
To overcome these two challenges, the following two lemmas are critical to reducing both the number of di erent cases and free variables:
Lemma 5.10. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the optimal at-most-three-menu mechanism includes bundling, (1, 1), as one of its menu.
Proof of Lemma 5.10. Without loss of generality, suppose that p ≥ q, and then there must be an optimal mechanism with α = β = 1. Because by replacing menu A with menu A = [ (1, 1) , p], the set of values where A dominating B and Z, S A will be a superset of S A , and similarly, S Z will be a subset of S Z , i.e., S A ⊇ S A and S Z ⊆ S Z . erefore,
, consider a mechanism with a menu (γ, δ) such that γ, δ 1 and (γ, δ) (0, 0), then by replacing the menu with (γ , δ ) (the price of the menu may also be di erent), the revenue of the new mechanism is no less than the original mechanism, where γ = 1 or δ = 1 or (γ , δ ) = (0, 0).
Proof of eorem 5.9. By Lemma 5.10, we can x α = 1 and β = 1. Moreover, without loss of generality, we could focus on the cases with p > q. Otherwise, the menu B will be dominated by menu A and menu Z, i.e., S B = ∅, hence reduced to a two-menu mechanism, where the optimal revenue is at most 2 √ 6/9. Similarly, by Lemma 5.11, we can x one of γ and δ to be 1, without loss of generality, γ = 1. Note that in the case with (γ, δ) = (0, 0), menu B will be dominated by menu Z, hence reduced to a two-menu mechanism again. erefore, we remain to solve (3M ) with additional constraints: α = β = γ = 1 and p > q. Now consider the values v = (v 1 , v 2 ) in S A ∩ S B , which must satisfy:
Note that if S A or S B is empty, there would be only two menus and the revenue cannot be more than 2 √ 6/9. Otherwise: • For S A not being empty, we must have v * 2 < 1, hence:
• For S B not being empty, we must have v * 1 < 1, hence:
Based on the constraints (N E A) and (N E B), there are three possible cases (see Figure 8 ). e solutions under these cases are summarized by the following lemmas. Lemma 5.13 (Case 2). Conditional on p ≥ 1 > q, the optimal mechanism yields revenue 14/27. Lemma 5.14 (Case 3). Conditional on p > q > 1, the revenue of the mechanism is not more than 1/2. In summary, the optimal mechanism with at most 3 menus is to sell the rst item at price 2/3 or the bundle of two items at price 5/6, yielding revenue 59/108.
Performance
Setup As our method is very e cient, we were able to perform our experiments on a laptop (13-inch MacBook Pro, with 2.5 GHz Intel Core i7 CPU, 16 GB RAM) using TensorFlow. To solve the problems with continuous value distributions in nite neural networks, we simply discretize the value space. In particular, the discretization is parameterized by N, which is the number of the intervals (with length 1/N) in unit length. In other words, there are N 2 squares of size 1/N by 1/N in any unit square. By default, we set N = 100.
E ciency and Accuracy: Compared with Linear Programs
We compare the running time of our method and the straightforward linear program approach for the U[0, 1] 2 se ing. In the linear program, the variables are the allocation x 1 , x 2 and payment p of the values on each discretized grid (hence O(N 2 ) variables) and the constraints are the IC and IR constraints (hence O (N 4 ) constraints) . We use the basic PuLP package in Python to solve the linear programs. In Figure 9 grows very rapidly: for N = 30, it takes 51 mins and we are not able to apply it to N ≥ 40. In contrast, the training time of our neural network grows much slower (less than 5 mins for N = 200, i.e., buyer distribution support of size 40000).
One key advantage of our approach over the linear program is that our problem size grows linearly in terms of the support size of the buyer's distribution (i.e., O(N 2 )), while the size of the linear program grows quadratically in terms of the support size (i.e., O(N 4 )). In Figure 9 (b), we also plot the average training time for each iteration, which is in 1 ∼ 30 milliseconds. Figure 9 (c) and Figure 9 (d) illustrates that our method converges to the optimal very fast. e relative error also drops very fast even in the log-scale plot. In particular, R is evaluated on the original continuous distribution U[0, 1] 2 . Hence the gap between R and O R cannot drop to zero as we discretized the value distribution. Conclusion So far, we have shown that our approach is much more e cient than the linear program appraoch and hence much stronger scalability as well. To completement the time e ciency, we also show in Appendix B that our method also dominates the linear program approach in terms of accuracy. For any line l v through v with a non-negative slope (or in nity), denote the part of R 3 that is above the line by R v . It is easy to verify that µ + (R U ) ≥ µ − (R U ) and µ + (R L ) ≤ µ − (R L ). us there exists a line l * v such that the corresponding R * v satis es µ + (R * v ) = µ − (R * v ). Now we show that for any two v and v , the intersection point of l * v and l * v is not inside R 3 . In Figure 10 , the three regions R 1 , R 2 , R 3 are the quadrangles OI DE, YCDI and CDE X, respectively. Let points A, B correspond to the value pro les v and v . Assume, on the contrary, that the intersection point of l * v (line AA ) and l * v (line BB ) is inside R 3 . en we have: µ + (ACDA ) = µ − (ACDA ) and µ + (BCDB ) = µ − (BCDB ).
(1) Figure 10 : e intersection point of l * v and l * v Note that µ + is only distributed along the line C X inside R 3 . us
However, µ − has a positive density inside R 3 . erefore, we have µ − (BCDA ) > µ − (BCDB ).
Combining equations (1), (2) and (3), we obtain:
Since µ + is uniformly distributed along the line C X with density , we have that µ + (BAA ) = 
